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Abstract 
As the number of multinational enterprises increases, the number of transactions between entities 
belonging to the same multinational group rises as well. Intercompany transactions generally offer the 
opportunity to shift income from one jurisdiction to the other. Income shifting can be driven by tax 
aspects, for instance a tax rate differential, or by firm-specific tax attributes like tax losses. At the 
same time, profit shifting imposes risk to governments as it may reduce tax revenues. More and more 
governments are therefore introducing and extending transfer pricing regulations in order to combat 
profit shifting through intercompany transactions. This study examines 44 countries and analyses the 
development of different aspects of transfer pricing regulations over a time period of nine years (2001-
2009). In order to show the differences of the regulations in a single measure, an attempt is made to 
categorize transfer pricing regulations regarding their stringency and impact. The results of the 
categorization confirm not only the increasing importance of transfer pricing regulations, but also offer 
very useful and valuable information for future research on the influence of transfer pricing 
regulations on corporate decisions.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, the globalization of markets and firms was accompanied by a development of 
powerful information technology and efficient communication systems. As a consequence 
multinational corporations have established highly integrated processes leading to an increasing 
amount of intercompany transactions.
1
 Such transactions often involve affiliates located in two 
different jurisdictions and therefore offer the possibility to shift profits within the multinational 
company and across borders. Among other reasons, profit shifting may be favourable for tax purposes 
as it influences taxable income. Generally, profits are shifted from high tax jurisdictions to low tax 
jurisdictions in order to benefit from tax rate differentials. Other objectives for profit shifting are the 
utilization of tax attributes, e.g. tax losses that expire after a certain number of years
2
, or tax incentives 
as well as subsidies.
3
  
As profit shifting directly impacts tax revenue, it is not surprising that national tax authorities try to 
counter such behaviour. Many countries have introduced anti-avoidance measures in order to prevent 
taxpayers from adjusting transfer prices for tax purposes. Such measures are usually based on the 
arm’s length principle stating that transactions between related parties need to be comparable with 
transactions between third parties. The OECD has undertaken great effort in the concretion of the 
arm’s length principle and has elaborated guidelines for the application of the principle which are 
followed by many OECD and non-OECD member countries. However, there are still great differences 
across countries with regard to how arm’s length prices should be determined, how they should be 
documented or what penalties arise on noncompliance. Therefore the objective of this study is, in a 
first step, to examine transfer pricing regulations across 44 countries over a time period of nine years 
(2001-2009). This study is, to our knowledge, the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of such regulations over time and a comparison of the regulations between countries and 
regions. In the course of the analysis, also the position of the OECD is outlined and put into relation 
with the results. As the regulations are very complex, the collection of information was challenging. 
Tax databases are usually only available for the current year and do not cover all aspects of the 
regulations. In order to get detailed information and avoid uncertainties, all necessary information was 
collected using several Transfer Pricing Guides
4
, but also a number of articles and other references 
were made use of.
5
  
                                                     
1
 While intercompany trade amounted to about 25% of world trade in the 1980s, in 2006, it was estimated to be 
as high as 60%, see Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 366. 
2
 See Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 365. 
3
 See Eden, L., Taxing Multinationals, 1998, p. 20. 
4
 Deloitte & Touche, Strategy Matrix for Global Transfer Pricing 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; 
Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guide 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010; KPMG, Global 
Transfer Pricing Review 2007, 2009, 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers, International Transfer Pricing 2002, 2003, 
2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. 
5
See appendix for references. 
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In a second step, this study will define a new variable which captures the strictness of transfer pricing 
regulations. The new variable relies on the collected country information for each year between 2001 
and 2009 and can be used for future research on transfer pricing and corporate behaviour. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of previous literature 
on this issue. Chapter 3 provides a short introduction to international tax planning opportunities with 
respect to transfer pricing and profit shifting. In addition, the actions undertaken by the OECD on this 
matter are described. Chapter 4 comprises the country comparison. Different aspects of transfer 
pricing regulations, i.e. their applicability, methods, required documentation, deadlines, statutes of 
limitation, penalties, and the possibility of advance pricing agreements, are examined and compared 
not only over time but also across countries. Chapter 5 conducts the categorization of transfer pricing 
regulations. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. 
2 Previous Literature 
Several studies have, so far, tried to capture the impact of transfer pricing regulations on corporate 
decisions. Borkowski (2010)
6
 uses mostly survey data to examine whether the choice of a transfer 
pricing method and the transfer pricing risks taken by multinational corporations are influenced by 
demographic, behavioural, financial, or tax variables. In order to account for differences in transfer 
pricing legislation and tax authority attitudes, she uses a home country dummy. This variable can only 
be a very rough proxy for the considered aspects as it also captures a multitude of other factors 
connected to the home country (e.g. size, wealth, currency, development, or corruption). Jost, 
Pfaffermayr, Stoeckl, and Winner (2011)
7
 apply a dummy variable capturing transfer pricing risk in 
their study on profit shifting within European multinationals. They define low and high risk depending 
on the existence of statutory transfer pricing regulations and a penalty regime where high risk is only 
imposed in case both components exist. They argue that the existence of penalties is usually connected 
with statutory documentation requirements and that therefore the documentation aspect is captured in 
the penalties component. In addition, a variable which states the time passed since the introduction of 
transfer pricing regulations is used in order to account for companies’ and tax administrations’ 
experience with the matter. The survey conducted in this study shows, however, that the existence of 
statutory rules alone is not a valid measure of transfer pricing risk. Some countries base their 
regulations on sophisticated guidelines which are not implemented in the tax law and others do not 
enforce statutory rules although they have existed for a long time. It is, therefore, necessary to include 
an enforcement component in addition, which is not only based on time of existence. 
                                                     
6
 See Borkowski, S.C., Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 2010, p. 35-54. 
7
 See Jost, S.P./Pfaffermayr, M./Stoeckl, M./Winner, H., Profit Shifting within Multinational Firms: The Role of 
Entity Characterization Profiles, Working Paper, February 2011. 
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Finally, Beuselinck, Deloof, and Vanstraelen (2009)
8
 examine income shifting in the European Union 
accounting for tax enforcement by defining a variable which comprises different features of transfer 
pricing regulations. Besides the availability of advance pricing agreements and audit risk, the 
strictness of documentation requirements is included. Each feature is expressed as a score between 0 
and 1, the sum of which is the value of the tax enforcement variable. Although this variable comprises 
important aspects of the strictness of transfer pricing regulations, it has to be interpreted with caution 
since the weights used for audit risk and documentation requirements are difficult to comprehend and 
their coverage is only limited over time.
9
 
This study adds to existing literature by defining a new variable which measures the strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations. The variable is based on a very comprehensive data collection and thereby 
extends the data background of other measures considerably. The variable consists of six categories 
which are, in contrast to some existing measures, precisely defined and easily comprehensible. The 
categories not only take into account the existence of transfer pricing regulations, but also the 
enforcement. It can, therefore, be a very useful and valuable component of future transfer pricing 
research. 
3 The Importance of Transfer Pricing Regulations 
3.1 International Tax Planning Opportunities  
As a consequence of globalization, more and more businesses form multinational groups which locate 
activities across countries. This structure challenges the tax systems incorporated worldwide as 
intercompany transactions may involve many different jurisdictions. While there are risks associated 
with the taxation of group income, e.g. the double taxation of income, a group structure also offers 
opportunities for tax planning.  
Tax planning, in this context, is a legal and accepted way of minimizing taxes and has to be 
distinguished from tax evasion which is illegal.
10
 The minimization of taxes can generally be achieved 
by realizing temporary or permanent tax savings.
11
 While temporary tax savings only defer tax 
payments to a later point in time, e.g. by retaining instead of distributing profits, permanent tax 
savings on the other hand will not reverse. They are for example achieved by utilizing tax losses that 
would expire after a certain number of years or by transferring taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions.  
                                                     
8
 See Beuselinck, C./Deloof, M./Vanstraelen, A., Multinational Income Shifting, Tax Enforcement and Firm 
Value, Working Paper, October 2009. 
9
 In both of the last two outlined studies, the bi-annual Ernst & Young transfer pricing guide (n. 4) was used for 
data collection.  
10
 For a distinction between tax planning, tax avoidance, and tax evasion see Russo, R., International Tax 
Planning, 2007, p. 49-57. 
11
 See Russo, R., International Tax Planning, 2007, p. 65-68. 
5 
 
For a long-term increase of profitability such permanent tax savings are crucial and multinational 
companies try to exploit their potential by identifying portable profits.
12
 There are mainly two 
alternatives. One is a restructuring of the business which includes the transfer of people, assets or of an 
entire plant to a low tax jurisdiction. This strategy could be observed in the past where a lot of 
multinationals have moved production to low-cost countries that also grant tax incentives, e.g. China 
or India.
13
 Rather than the shifting of capital, a second and less complicated alternative includes the 
shifting of income to a jurisdiction where more favourable tax attributes can be used, e.g. a lower 
income tax rate, tax incentives, or existing tax losses.
14
  
Income can be shifted in several different ways, e.g. by intercompany financing, by a centralization of 
functions, or by adjusting prices of intercompany trade or services.
15
 All these actions take advantage 
of the fact that tax systems treat corporations as separate entities
16
 and allow for a deduction of 
expenses in one jurisdiction and accordingly a receipt of payments in another jurisdiction. But they 
also encourage arrangements purely based on the intention to save taxes.
17
 Therefore they may go 
beyond acceptable tax planning and impose a threat to jurisdictions’ tax revenues. Due to the 
increasing number of multinational companies, which are furthermore under the strain of increasing 
profitability, and intercompany transactions, governments have become more aware of this risk in past 
decades. Besides transfer pricing regulations, which are in the focus of this study, several other anti-
avoidance measures to prevent multinationals from shifting profits out of the country (e.g. thin 
capitalization rules) have been introduced.  
3.2 OECD 
As an extension to Article 9 of the OECD Model, which comprises the arm’s length principle, a first 
report purely on transfer pricing matters
18
 was published in 1979, which served as a basis for the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines issued in 1995.
19
  
The guidelines deal with numerous aspects of transfer pricing. They offer detailed guidance for both, 
multinational companies and tax administrations, on the application of the arm’s length principle, 
including several methods for the determination of arm’s length prices and their appropriateness with 
regards to the comparability of transactions. In addition they provide assistance on administrative 
issues as well as recommendations on the documentation of transfer pricing. In 1996, two chapters 
                                                     
12
 See Russo, R., International Tax Planning, 2007, p. 76. 
13
 See Endres, D./Fuest, C./Spengel, C., Company Taxation in the Asia-Pacific Region, India, and Russia, 2010, 
p. 33-54; Timberlake, J./Schneider, P./Dong Terry, S., Deloitte Review 2009, p. 105-119. 
14
 See Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 365. 
15
 See Russo, R., International Tax Planning, 2007, p. 76-78. 
16
 Note that the OECD also recommends a separate entity approach for permanent establishments, OECD, 2010 
Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, 22 July 2010. 
17
 See Eden, L., Taxing Multinationals, 1998, p. 19-26; Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 364-
366. 
18
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, 1979. 
19
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 1995/96/97. 
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dealing with special problems regarding intangibles and intra-group services were added. A chapter on 
cost contribution arrangements was included in 1997. The last chapter so far was introduced in 2010 
and comprises aspects of business restructurings. At the same time the chapters on the arm’s length 
principle and the applicable methods were modified. The specific content of the guidelines will be 
outlined in the following. 
4 Transfer Pricing Regulations 
4.1 Existence and Applicability 
Almost all tax codes worldwide contain anti-avoidance regulations with respect to the conditions of 
intercompany transactions. Such anti-avoidance regulations are mainly based on the arm’s length 
principle which the OECD member countries have agreed upon as an international standard for 
transfer pricing. It supports an equal treatment of independent companies and those part of a 
multinational enterprise which avoids the possibility of tax loopholes and the creation of market 
distortions. A downside of the principle is that it may not always take economies of scale or other 
privileges into account that prevail for associated companies.
20
  
In addition to a general anti-avoidance regulation, many countries have also introduced specific 
transfer pricing regulations. However, the survey showed that the definition of transfer pricing 
regulations and especially their distinction to general anti-avoidance rules is not always clear. For this 
survey, it is assumed that transfer pricing regulations exist where, in addition to the arm’s length 
principle, key elements, such as the terms related party or controlled transaction, methods or 
documentation requirements, are additionally included in the national tax law. Where only guidelines 
published by the tax authorities supplement the anti-avoidance rule in the tax law, it is still defined as 
a general anti-avoidance rule. However, this distinction does not always indicate that a general anti-
avoidance rule is generally more generous than transfer pricing regulations. This has much rather to 
been seen in context with the other aspects of the regulations outlined in the following sections. In 
some cases, guidelines in conjunction with a general anti-avoidance rule are very sophisticated and 
often enforced (e.g. Australia or China before 2008), while transfer pricing regulations included in the 
national tax law are only rarely applied (e.g. Russia).  
Table A1 in the appendix shows that the arm’s length principle is included in the national tax law of 
almost all considered countries in this survey which proves that it is the internationally accepted 
standard for transfer pricing. The only exception is Brazil where maximum price ceilings and 
minimum income floors are defined. Specific transfer pricing regulations were mainly introduced in 
the last two decades (see Figure 1). The United States was the first country to focus on intercompany 
                                                     
20
 See Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 367-368; Francescucci, D.L.P., International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 2004, p. 68-72; OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, 22 July 2010, Para. 1.8-1.10. 
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transactions and extended the transfer pricing regulations as early as 1968. Until now it is seen as one 
of the toughest and most detailed transfer pricing systems in the world.
21
 Five countries, mainly large, 
developed economies followed in the 1980s (Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan). 17 
countries introduced transfer pricing regulations between 1990 and 1999 and 14 in the surveyed time 
period (2001-2009). This development can be attributed to globalization and the increasing awareness 
of this matter, but also to the fact that the introduction of transfer pricing regulations can function as a 
defence against other countries. As taxpayers tend to allocate more taxable income to countries where 
regulations are extremely aggressive in order to ensure compliance, the introduction of transfer pricing 
regulations can be a way to protect tax revenues.
22
  
Figure 1: Introduction of Transfer Pricing Regulations  
 
There are seven countries in the sample that still do not have transfer pricing regulations introduced to 
their tax law. Those countries are Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Switzerland, and Thailand. In the case of Austria, it is rather unexpected that no detailed regulations 
exist, but tax authorities are aware of this issue and apply the OECD guidelines consequently. Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland, on the other hand, are all European developed countries that attract a 
large amount of international investments due to their generous tax regulations.
23
 It may, therefore, be 
the case that those countries benefit from non-arm’s length transactions which may explain the 
missing regulations. At last, while Malaysia and Thailand both introduced detailed guidelines with 
                                                     
21
 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, International Transfer Pricing 2011, United States, p. 777. 
22
 See Calderón, J.M., Intertax 2005, p. 109; Kobetsky, M., Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2008, p. 363. 
23
 See Grimes, L./Maguire, T., European Taxation 2005, p. 148-154; Bogaerts, R., European Taxation 2002, p. 
380-388; both, Luxembourg and Switzerland, were the only two OECD member countries that abstained in the 
approval of the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, 1998, which is also prove for the generous tax 
regulations in those countries. 
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respect to the general anti-avoidance rule and already pay attention to transfer pricing issues, the 
Philippines are now starting to focus on the matter.
24
 
As follows from the arm’s length principle, transactions under consideration are those between related 
parties. Such related parties may either be located in the same country or abroad. In addition, some 
countries treat unrelated parties in tax havens as related parties. The majority of countries apply 
transfer pricing regulations to domestic and foreign related parties. Profit shifting usually only leads to 
a tax revenue loss if shifted cross-border, but as many countries offer very advantageous tax incentives 
for certain types of investment or for investments in certain regions, e.g. lower tax rates or tax 
holidays, a more favourable tax position can also be created through profit shifting between domestic 
related parties. The survey shows that most of the countries applying their rules to domestic and 
foreign related parties have a tax incentive system in place.
25
 In turn, the countries restricting transfer 
pricing regulations only to foreign related entities are mainly developed, high-tax countries (e.g. 
Canada, Germany, Japan, or the USA). 
The survey also shows that seven countries apply their transfer pricing regulations also to unrelated 
parties in tax havens, the countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela. All countries are located in South America which may be explained by their geographical 
proximity to the most relevant tax havens in the world.
26
  
A definition of associated enterprises is also included in Article 9 of the OECD Model. It states that 
two parties are related if one party “participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or 
capital of the other or if the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control, 
or capital of both parties”. Such a participation is stated as “de facto control” and “under common 
control” in Table A1. The OECD does, neither in the Model Tax Convention nor in the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, define a certain minimum threshold which determines control. This approach is 
followed by 13 of the 44 considered countries (amongst others: Australia, Chile, France, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and the United States). All other countries define a fixed percentage of capital shareholding 
which identifies related parties. Poland introduced the lowest threshold of at least 5% for the definition 
of a related party. The largest group of countries uses a 25% capital contribution (including China and 
Germany) for their related party definition. A 50% shareholding is used by seven countries (e.g. 
Argentina or Japan). It is questionable whether the threshold gives an indication of how strict tax 
authorities are with regards to the identification of controlled transactions. At least for the countries 
without a fixed threshold, a conclusion on their stringency cannot be drawn. 
                                                     
24
 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, International Transfer Pricing 2011, Philippines, p. 639. 
25
 For an overview of tax incentives in the Asia-Pacific region, see Endres, D./Fuest, C./Spengel, C., Company 
Taxation in the Asia-Pacific Region, India, and Russia, 2010, p. 33-54. See also UNCTAD, Tax Incentives and 
Foreign Direct Investment – A Global Survey, 2000, p. 69, 119, 145. 
26
 See Owens, J./Sanelli, A., Fiscal Havens in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007, Part 5, p. 2. 
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4.2 Methods 
Based on the arm’s length principle, several methods have been established in order to determine the 
appropriate transfer price for a certain transaction. In its 1979 report, the OECD has introduced three 
traditional transaction methods (the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale price 
method (RPM), and the cost plus method) with a clear preference for the CUP method. After the 
United States had announced additional methods based on profit comparisons in the early 1990s, the 
OECD also extended its recommendations. In the Transfer Pricing Guidelines published in 1995, 
besides the traditional transactions methods, two transactional profit methods (transactional net margin 
method (TNMM) and profit split method) were included, which define prices based on different profit 
allocations. While the OECD expressed a clear preference for the traditional transaction methods, 
especially the CUP method
27
, the United States introduced a best method rule.
28
 Only in 2010, the 
OECD has published an amended version of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines showing a greater 
openness towards the transactional profits methods.
29
  
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method  
Under the CUP method, the price of an uncontrolled transaction is compared with the price of a 
controlled transaction. An uncontrolled transaction implies that the parties involved are not affiliated 
and are themselves not part of a group.  
The major requirement of the CUP method is the comparability of transactions. The OECD outlines 
several characteristics which have to be comparable, i.e. among others, product type, quality, 
availability, assets used and risks assumed, contractual terms, and economic circumstances (e.g. level 
of market, geography, and timing). If such a comparable transaction can be identified or if differences 
can be accounted for by reasonably adjusting the price, tax administrations usually prefer the CUP 
method.  
However, in some cases, the CUP method may not be applicable, e.g. if the market is not competitive 
or if assets are so unique that a comparable transaction cannot be identified. This holds especially true 
for transactions involving intangible assets as they usually base on substantial negotiations and 
contract terms and bargaining power can in most cases not be observed.
30
  
                                                     
27
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 22 July 2010, 
Para. 2.5. 
28
 For further explanation see below. 
29
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 22 July 2010, 
Para. 2.3. 
30
 See King, E., Transfer Pricing and Corporate Taxation,  2009, p. 24-25. 
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Resale Price Method (RPM) 
Under the resale price method, in order to find an arm’s length price, the resale price obtained by a 
distributor is reduced by an appropriate gross margin. The appropriate gross margin can be found with 
reference to transactions with unaffiliated companies (internal comparable). In case, such a 
comparison is not possible, the gross margins of other individual distributors of similar products may 
be used (external comparable). 
The method is based on the assumption that gross margins are comparable for all products. This 
implies that products and circumstances of the transaction must be similar - under US regulations even 
higher standards of comparability are required than for the CUP method. However, it is questionable 
whether this assumption is true even if comparability prevails because it also suggests that gross 
margins are equal over firms, which does not seem a realistic assumption.
31
 For those reasons, the 
OECD guidelines state that adjustments are needed under several circumstances which increase the 
documentation effort and complexity of the RPM method. 
Cost Plus Method 
The cost plus method is very similar to the resale price method, but takes the perspective of a 
manufacturer selling similar products to affiliated and unaffiliated companies. It adds an appropriate 
cost plus mark up to the costs of goods sold to find an arm’s length price. 
The same critique as to the resale price method can generally be applied to the cost plus method. 
Especially whether cost plus mark ups are similar over different products and different firms and 
whether costs are even an appropriate starting point.
32
 
Profit Split Method 
Under the profit split method total profits accruing from controlled transactions are identified and split 
between all associated companies using ratios that would have been utilized in an uncontrolled 
transaction. The method can be applied using ex ante or ex post profits, i.e. projected or actual profits. 
The split of profits should take into account the circumstances of the transaction and consider assets 
used and risks assumed by the associated companies. This can be done by using comparables or by 
applying a residual approach. The residual profit split method, in a first step, allocates profits to the 
associated companies using one of the other methods (traditional transaction method or 
TNMM/CPM), not accounting for individual contributions. In a second step, the residual profit is split 
according to the relative value of each partner’s contribution. The comparable profit split method, on 
the other hand, uses comparable transactions between independent parties for the allocation of profits. 
                                                     
31
 See King, E., Transfer Pricing and Corporate Taxation,  2009, p. 19-21. 
32
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 22 July 2010, 
Para. 2.43. 
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This is done by defining key allocators which are based on assets/capital, costs, headcounts, or time 
spent.
33
  
The profit split method allows an analysis of transfer prices for more complex business structures, e.g. 
highly integrated processes. Due to the two-sided approach, cases where both parties of a transaction 
contribute unique and valuable components can be accounted for. However, the measuring of total 
profits may be a difficult task, especially if considering foreign affiliates.
34
 As the residual profit split 
method makes use of a second method, the shortcomings of that method have to be considered as well. 
Furthermore, it is questionable, whether the profit allocation of independent companies with reference 
to key allocators provides appropriate ratios.  
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) and Comparable Profits Method (CPM) 
The TNMM, as outlined in the OECD guidelines, and the CPM, which is part of US transfer pricing 
regulations
35
, are both based on the comparison of the taxpayer with a group of similar, standalone 
companies. The companies in the sample have to operate in the same field, perform similar functions, 
and distribute comparable products. For each company, a profit level indicator (PLI), e.g. operating 
profits to sales or gross profits to operating expenses, is calculated, which is then applied to the 
respective denominator of the taxpayer’s accounting results. While the CPM applies a “top-down”-
approach, which means that the entire operations of the company are broken down to transactions, the 
TNMM uses a “bottom-up”-approach and starts on the transactional level. If the profit level indicator 
of a controlled transaction lies within a range of indicators of uncontrolled transactions, the transfer 
price is assumed to be appropriate.  
The advantages of both methods are that information is more easily available and that the 
documentation effort is reduced compared to other methods. However, operating profits can be 
affected by several factors which are hard to identify and to quantify.
36
 Therefore it is often argued 
that transfer prices found are not at arm’s length.37 
Selection of Method 
The OECD generally prefers the traditional transaction methods as they are a more direct way of 
identifying a transfer price. However, ultimately the facts and circumstances of the transaction are 
crucial. In cases where no or not sufficient information on third parties is available or where business 
processes are very complex and a two-sided approach is needed, the transactional profit methods can 
                                                     
33
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 22 July 2010, 
Para. 2.135. 
34
 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 22 July 2010, 
Para. 2.114. 
35
 See US-Regulations § 1.482-5. 
36
 See Vögele, A./Borstell, T./Engler, G., Verrechnungspreise, 2011, p. 321. 
37
 For a more detailed discussion of the Transactional Net Margin Method and Comparable Profit Method see 
Casley, A./Kritikides, A., International Transfer Pricing Journal 2003, p. 162-168. 
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be more appropriate. Other countries, including the United States, do not define a priority of methods, 
but take several factors into account in order to identify the most appropriate method (also called best 
method). The process of identifying the most appropriate method differs between countries, but it 
often includes the testing of each single method. 
Table A2 provides an overview of the applicable transfer pricing methods and their priority in the 
considered countries. Regarding the different transfer pricing methods, there is only little variation 
across countries. With the exception of Brazil, the OECD transfer pricing methods are widely 
accepted. Since Brazil did not base transfer pricing regulations on the arm’s length principle, the 
available methods differ and include fixed margins applied on resale price or costs. In an international 
context, this causes large problems as the methods will vary in both countries involved in the 
transaction which may in turn lead to double taxation.
38
 Another exceptional method which uses the 
market value established in transparent markets of certain goods on the day of their shipment was 
introduced by Argentina in 2005. The method is mandatory if certain conditions are fulfilled.
39
  
Only few countries (e.g. Chile, Greece, or Russia) have limited their acceptable methods to the 
traditional transaction methods (CUP, RPM, and Cost Plus). In Russia, the limited number of methods 
comes along with a strict hierarchy of methods which makes the regulation very difficult and 
inefficient in practice.
40
 In Greece, the acceptable methods were even more limited until 2009. Only 
the CUP method could be used to determine arm’s length prices causing great difficulties in 
identifying comparable transactions as the required data was not always available.
41
 
Also with respect to the priority of methods, the great majority of countries follows the approach by 
the OECD and prefers the traditional transactions methods over the transactional profit methods. Some 
countries apply, in addition, a strict preference for the CUP method (e.g. Australia, Italy, or Mexico). 
Nine countries use a best method rule for the selection of the applicable method (e.g. Argentina, Peru, 
China, India, or the USA).  
Out of the OECD member countries, only Greece and Ireland do not follow the OECD guidelines. In 
Ireland only a very general anti-avoidance rule is in place which does not require the definition of 
methods. 
4.3 Documentation Requirements 
In order to monitor the transfer pricing policy of multinational companies, tax authorities in most 
countries require detailed documentation. The preparation of sufficient documentation is especially 
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important as in most countries the burden of proof will then rest on the tax authorities. It may, 
however, switch to the taxpayer if documentation is incomplete or inaccurate. 
The OECD has included a chapter on recommended documentation in its Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
which is supposed to help tax authorities when formulating documentation inquiries as well as 
taxpayers when preparing documentation on intercompany transactions. It states that “information 
about the associated enterprises involved in the controlled transactions, the transactions at issue, the 
functions performed, [and] information derived from independent enterprises engaged in similar 
transactions or businesses” is required to analyse transfer pricing policies.42 The guidelines also 
include other factors that should be documented in certain transactions or under certain circumstances 
such as a business outline, an organizational structure, or an economic analysis.
43
 It has, however, to 
be noted that all explanations are only recommendations and do not go into much detail concerning 
their implementation. 
Besides the documentation that should be maintained by the taxpayer, some countries even require 
information to be disclosed with the annual tax return. In this regard, the OECD recommends that the 
requested information should be limited to an extent that allows the tax authorities to identify 
taxpayers that require additional examination. 
As detailed country-specific information is not available and only hard to assess, the exact content of 
the requested documentation in each country is difficult to capture. Lists of required documents may 
exist, but it is not always clear whether such lists are enforced in practice. Therefore the overview in 
Table A3 is limited to the existence of documentation requirements and whether taxpayers are obliged 
to disclose any information with the tax authorities. In the case that documentation requirements are 
not implemented in the national tax law (no statutory requirement), documentation may still be 
required in practice, based on tax administration’s guidelines or the fact that companies are expected 
to provide documentation in an audit. For simplification, the content of the required disclosure is 
stated as short or long in Table A3. A short content is assumed to exist if only a summary or overview 
of transactions is necessary for disclosure, while a long content is assumed if (almost) full 
documentation (also called a transfer pricing study) is required.  
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Figure 2: Introduction of Statutory Documentation Requirements 
 
Figure 2 shows that documentation has become an important issue in the past ten years. 21 out of the 
27 countries applying a statutory documentation requirement have introduced it in the last decade. 
Only six countries already had documentation requirements in place before 2001. The introduction of 
a statutory documentation requirement was in most cases linked to the introduction of transfer pricing 
regulations in general. Especially the Southern American and Asian countries have introduced 
comprehensive rules in the considered time period. The only country that introduced transfer pricing 
regulations without a documentation requirement is Belgium. Interestingly, a lot of European countries 
have had transfer pricing regulations in place for a considerable time period before they extended their 
scope and included a documentation requirement. This shows the increasing awareness of transfer 
pricing and the need for proper documentation. 
Only three out of the 17 countries that still do not have a statutory requirement, do not require 
documentation to exist in practice (Chile, Ireland, and Ukraine). The remaining 14 countries require 
documentation to exist in practice, especially in the course of an audit. The fact that a documentation 
requirement is included in the national tax law does, however, not necessarily mean that 
documentation is strictly enforced. Therefore another aspect, the required disclosure of documents, 
should be taken into account.  
By the year 2009, 24 countries require a disclosure of documents on transfer pricing, eleven of which 
have introduced the disclosure during the considered time period. Remarkably, out of the 20 countries, 
that still do not require any disclosure in the annual tax return, 17 are European countries (the other 
three countries are Chile, the Philippines, and Thailand). This shows that while many European 
15 
 
countries have introduced a statutory documentation requirement, they have not taken the second step 
and added a mandatory disclosure to their regulations. The survey also shows that the need to submit 
documents to the tax authorities is not always connected with a statutory documentation requirement 
in the tax law. Six countries have required or still require a disclosure of information although no 
statutory requirement exists (i.e. Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Italy, and Malaysia). In most 
cases, the disclosure is then based on detailed guidelines by the tax authorities. 
A distinction can also be made with respect to the content of the disclosure. While some countries only 
require a short summary or overview over controlled transactions, other countries require a transfer 
pricing study. Out of the 24 countries where submitting documentation is required, 16 require a short 
and eight a long content. Interestingly, the countries requesting an extensive disclosure are, with the 
exception of Mexico, no OECD member states. The content of disclosure has generally been extended 
over the last decade, i.e. Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Peru have switched from a short to a long 
content. 
From the survey, it becomes evident that a great variety of documentation requirements exists. The 
compliance with those detailed requirements demands a high allocation of resources and effort from 
multinational companies. Therefore, there have been approaches to reduce the complexity of 
documentation. Firstly, the European Union has set up a Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in early 2002 
which consists of 25 Member States representatives and 10 business representatives. It has worked out 
a report regarding standardized documentation requirements of transfer price determination for all 
Member States. The report functions as a guideline, but it is not legally binding. A study conducted by 
CFE shows that so far about 44% of EU member states have implemented the Code of Conduct in 
their tax legislation.
44
 Secondly, the PATA, an inter-governmental organization that comprises 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States, published a documentation package in 2003 that 
allows taxpayers to file only one set of documentation which is accepted in all member countries and 
will not lead to penalties.
45
  
4.4 Submission Deadlines 
Another aspect of transfer pricing regulations are submission deadlines for full documentation or for 
transfer pricing disclosure. Full documentation is in most countries only submitted upon request, but 
the time period available may vary. For the disclosure, it is usually the deadline of the annual tax 
return, but may in some cases also be a separate date. Table A4 therefore gives an overview of 
applicable deadlines for full documentation and disclosure. It shows that great differences exist in the 
amount of days that taxpayers are granted to submit the required documentation. The countries 
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requiring an extensive disclosure generally grant a longer period of time for the submission of the tax 
return, i.e. between four months from tax year end in Indonesia and twelve months from tax return 
submission in Ecuador, resulting in an average of 7.6 months. In contrast, the countries requiring a 
short disclosure only allow for a shorter period of time, i.e. between two months from tax year end in 
Japan and seven months from tax year end in Malaysia and Italy, the average being 4.7 months, which 
shows that the disclosure dates of the transfer pricing return generally reflect the required content. 
The deadlines for the full documentation can be compared for the countries not requiring a disclosure 
and those requiring a short disclosure. Overall, the deadlines are between three days in Hungary and 
three months in Canada, the Netherlands, and Slovenia. Where a short disclosure is required, the 
deadlines for the full documentation are slightly longer (average 43.1 days) than in the countries 
without any disclosure (average 35.9 days). A possible explanation could be the fact that the tax 
authorities in the latter case do not have any information on the transfer pricing policy, therefore they 
require the necessary information in a shorter period of time. A geographical or OECD membership 
correlation does not exist with regards to the deadlines, instead the strictest and the most generous 
countries are both members of the OECD.  
4.5 Penalties  
In order to enforce the correct handling of tax regulations, many countries impose penalties. Besides 
penalties on the wrong determination of taxable income, regulations may also include penalties on 
wrong or incomplete documentation. The OECD acknowledges the use of penalties in order to ensure 
compliance, but emphasizes the need for a fair and not too burdensome regime. It is argued that a 
penalty regime that is too hard on the taxpayers may distort the determination of taxable income 
between two jurisdictions.
46
 Therefore, the OECD member states have agreed to not impose 
substantial penalties on taxpayers who have acted in good faith.
47
 Most countries apply general tax 
penalties to transfer pricing cases, but some countries have introduced special transfer pricing 
penalties, especially with respect to documentation. 
As can be seen in Table A5, information on transfer pricing penalties is exceptionally difficult to 
gather as several available sources state conflicting information. Therefore, the table does not provide 
a comprehensive list, but rather indicates the penalties that could be identified for a given country in a 
given year. There may be additional penalties not listed in the table and penalties may be applicable 
for a longer period of time. 
The first aspect considered in this overview is whether special transfer pricing penalties exist or if the 
general tax penalties are applicable for transfer pricing matters. It can be found that the great majority 
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of countries (32 out of 44 countries) does not impose special transfer pricing penalties. Out of the 
remaining twelve countries, eight countries have introduced the special transfer pricing penalties in the 
considered time period. The introduction of transfer pricing penalties is in most cases connected with 
the introduction of statutory documentation requirements (e.g. in China, Ecuador, Germany, India, 
Romania, and in Spain). It is therefore not surprising that the special penalties typically refer to the 
transfer pricing documentation requirements, while penalties on transfer pricing adjustments are 
usually the same as for other taxable income adjustments. 
Penalties on Transfer Pricing Adjustments 
The penalties on adjustments of transfer prices follow a similar pattern but lie in a broad range 
regarding their severity. In most cases, the penalties on a transfer pricing adjustment are expressed as a 
percentage of unpaid tax or of the transfer pricing adjustment itself. About half of the countries apply a 
percentage of less than 100% of additional tax with Austria (2%), Denmark (surcharge of about 6%), 
and Vietnam (10%) being the countries with the lowest rates. The other half imposes penalties of at 
least 100%, Argentina of even 400%. Five countries (Canada, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Spain) use 
the transfer pricing adjustment as the base of the penalty, thereby applying a special tax rate on the 
additional income. The rates range from 10% in Canada and Greece to 50% in Poland. In many 
countries, a higher percentage applies to cases where transfer prices were fraudulently manipulated. 
Some countries even limit the imposition of penalties to cases of fraud (e.g. Russia or Switzerland). 
The applicable percentages are at least doubled, ranging between 20% in Russia and 1,000% in 
Argentina. However, it has to be mentioned that many countries allow for a reduction in penalties on 
the adjustment if sufficient documentation exists. The reduction usually depends on the quality of the 
documentation and is therefore difficult to quantify (for that reason, it is not included in Table A5). 
Overall, no trend as to the application of stricter or milder penalties over time can be observed, while 
some countries increase the percentages (Argentina), others decrease them (Malaysia, Mexico, and 
Vietnam).  
Another aspect of penalties on transfer pricing adjustments is interest on the late payment of taxes. It is 
imposed in almost all countries. While some countries only apply a federal or market rate in order to 
account for the time value of the payments, others impose interest rates that include a penalty 
component. In particular this means that interest rates may be as high as 3% per month or 0.1% per 
day which amount to approximately 36% per year (Argentina and Vietnam). 
Penalties on Documentation 
Penalties on documentation also vary significantly. For 14 out of the 44 considered countries, it is 
known that no documentation penalties exist (e.g. Australia, Japan, and the United States). But many 
countries impose penalties on wrong, late or missing documentation. The penalties either amount to a 
fixed monetary amount, to a percentage of unpaid tax or to another specific factor as defined in the 
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national tax code. 16 countries impose a fixed fine which lies between RON14,000 (~USD3,900) in 
Romania and ARS450,000 (~USD150,000) in Argentina. The Latin American countries tend to 
express monetary fines in tax units (e.g. Peru, up to 30TU with 1TU=~USD1,000). The value of a tax 
unit is defined in the tax law and is adjusted according to inflation.  
Eight countries (e.g. Belgium, Brazil, and the United Kingdom) impose a penalty on the transfer 
pricing adjustment only if no documentation exists. The percentage ranges between 45% in Malaysia 
and 225% in Brazil. The distinction between documentation and adjustment penalties is rather difficult 
in this case, but generally, adjustment penalties are also applicable if full documentation exists. There 
may be a reduction regarding the quality of the provided information, but it is not only imposed if no 
documentation exists. 
Some countries define other specific measurements for documentation penalties, for example, a 
percentage of the transaction value for which the information is wrong or missing (e.g. Brazil and 
Colombia). A very interesting approach is chosen by Denmark where the penalty amounts to 200% of 
costs saved by not preparing documentation. It is questionable how saved costs should be calculated 
and so far - although introduced in 2006 - no guidance exists on that behalf. 
4.6 Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations defines the time period during which tax authorities can undertake 
reassessments of the tax liability. It is therefore also part of transfer pricing regulations as it prescribes 
how long documentation has to be kept or how long changes can be made to transfer prices applied in 
intercompany transactions. Table A6 provides an overview of national regulations on statutes of 
limitations. It shows that most countries (28 out of 44 countries) use the tax year end or the end of the 
year in which the tax return has been filed to determine the beginning of the statute of limitations. The 
remaining countries apply the date of the filing of the return.  
In order to compare the duration of the statute of limitations, it is assumed that the end of the filing 
year is one year after the end of the tax year. The survey then shows that the great majority of 
countries applies a duration of up to five years (34 countries), the shortest time period being two years 
(e.g. Colombia, India, France, or Russia). The longest statutes of limitations are prescribed by 
Australia (unlimited), the Czech Republic, Switzerland (both 15 years), and Austria (10 years). It has 
to be noted that the four countries that have amended their regulations on the statute of limitations 
have reduced the duration (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, and Indonesia). 
13 countries apply a longer duration of the statute of limitations for cases of fraud. The interval is 
usually at least doubled, with four countries even applying an unlimited time period (i.e. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Ukraine, and the US). The Netherlands are the only country which prescribes a specified 
statute of limitations for foreign income (i.e. 12 years, compared to 5 years for other income). 
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4.7 Advance Pricing Agreements 
In the course of the application of transfer pricing regulations, disputes may arise between taxpayers 
and tax authorities. An adjustment of transfer prices by one jurisdiction can lead to double taxation as 
the other jurisdiction may not always agree with the adjustment. Thus, several approaches exist in 
order to prevent double taxation and minimise transfer pricing disputes which the OECD has outlined 
in its Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
48
  
The OECD Model contains two Articles which include approaches for dealing with tax disputes: the 
mutual agreement procedure and corresponding adjustments. The mutual agreement procedure 
(Article 25 OECD Model) can be used to eliminate double taxation. In Art. 25 para. 3 OECD Model, it 
is stated that “tax authorities should try to solve by a mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts 
which arise as to the interpretation or application of the Convention”. As provided for in Paragraph 10 
of the Commentary on Article 25, this explicitly applies to transfer pricing adjustments following Art. 
9 para. 1 OECD Model. The tax administrations are obliged to solve the case within two years, 
otherwise the taxpayer may choose to solve the case through an arbitration process.
49
  
Article 9 para. 2 OECD Model deals with requests for corresponding adjustments which may be 
subject of a mutual agreement procedure. It especially refers to adjustments between associated 
companies and demands tax authorities to coordinate adjustments so that no double taxation occurs. 
The European Union has also made an attempt to simplify the solution of transfer pricing disputes.  In 
1990, the Member States signed a convention which deals with the elimination of double taxation due 
to income adjustments between associated entities.
50
 This Arbitration Convention was amended in 
2008 and now covers all 27 Member States. It applies to cases where transfer prices are not 
deliberately wrong, i.e. where no serious penalties arise. In addition, the convention sets a time limit 
for mutual agreements between two or more Member States on transfer pricing issues. 
In an advance pricing arrangement (APA), a set of characteristics for controlled transactions is 
determined in advance and for a fixed period of time. Some countries offer unilateral APAs that are 
concluded between the taxpayer and the tax administration in the same jurisdiction and do not take 
other parties into account. But since unilateral APAs also affect the tax liability of the related party, 
there may still be a need for an agreement procedure. Therefore, bilateral or multilateral APAs are 
more favourable.
51
 In those cases, taxpayers of at least two jurisdictions negotiate with the responsible 
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tax administrations and identify a transfer pricing strategy that is more equitable to all participants in 
the agreement. Such arrangements reduce the risk of double taxation and lead to a greater certainty in 
international trade, which is supported by the result of a survey conducted by Ernst & Young, where 
90% of multinationals that have entered into advance pricing agreements indicated that they would use 
them again.
52
 
Some countries offer sophisticated procedures for the set-up of an APA, others do not allow for 
binding agreements between the tax administration and the taxpayer. In such cases, an APA can only 
be concluded between tax authorities through a mutual agreement procedure on a case-by-case basis.  
Figure 3: Advance Pricing Agreements 
 
Figure 3 (based on Table A7) shows that APAs are common in the considered countries. Only ten 
countries do still not allow for such agreements. Unilateral agreements are generally easier to 
administer as they only consider one country and can be dealt with in an existing rulings process. 
Bilateral agreements, on the other hand, require an extensive procedure that has to be set up in most 
tax administrations. It is therefore not surprising that most countries start with the availability of 
unilateral agreements and later extend the procedure to bilateral agreements. By the end of the 
considered time period, more countries offer uni- and bilateral agreements than only unilateral 
agreements.  
Where advance pricing agreements were newly introduced in the considered time period, three 
countries have introduced the possibility for unilateral agreements (i.e. Czech Republic, Ecuador, and 
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Peru), while six countries have introduced an agreements procedure offering uni- and bilateral 
agreements (i.e. Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Venezuela). For most of those 
countries, the introduction took place after transfer pricing regulations and documentation 
requirements were in place. An exception is Malaysia, where no transfer pricing rules exist and 
Venezuela where all aspects were introduced at once. Besides Malaysia, there are only few countries 
where the possibility for a bilateral agreement existed before transfer pricing rules were introduced 
(i.e. China, the Netherlands, and Thailand). Another seven countries have extended the scope of their 
agreements procedure to uni- and bilateral agreements. As an exception, Germany only allows for 
bilateral agreements.  
Surprisingly there are still a number of countries that have comprehensive transfer pricing regulations 
in place, but do not offer the possibility to enter into an advance pricing agreement. Those countries 
are Argentina, Greece, India, Indonesia, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden.  
Nevertheless, the overview shows that countries are increasingly offering advance pricing agreements. 
This may be an answer to the need of multinational companies to reduce their risk in transfer pricing 
matters as awareness is rising. But it can also be argued that the introduction of APAs functions as a 
tax incentive, giving the tax authorities a possibility to agree on rather flexible terms and thereby 
attracting investment.
53
 
5 Categorization of Transfer Pricing Regulations  
The previous chapter provides a comprehensive overview of different aspects of transfer pricing 
regulations. As the scope of regulations was continuously extended, it becomes obvious that transfer 
pricing is increasingly important, to governments and to multinational corporations. A survey 
conducted by Ernst & Young in 2010, in which multinationals across 25 countries were interviewed 
on their perception on transfer pricing, underlines this result. About 75% of the respondents stated that 
transfer pricing will be “absolutely critical” or “very important” in the following two years.54 
We therefore compare countries and provide a measure for the strictness of national transfer pricing 
regulations. As outlined in Chapter 2, we thereby extend several existing studies that have so far tried 
to identify an appropriate measure and introduce a new measure based on the regulations described in 
the preceding chapter. 
First, it is crucial to define strictness. On the one hand, the design and scope of implemented rules 
have to be taken into account. The applicability to a broader range of taxpayers, the requirement of an 
extensive documentation in a rather short period of time and high material penalties are elements of a 
strict regulation. But on the other hand, also the enforcement and awareness of such rules has to be 
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considered. As one element of enforcement, we consider whether or not regulations are introduced in 
national tax law since statutory rules generally have a wider range and importance than guidelines 
published by the tax authorities. The survey shows that especially the introduction of documentation 
requirements into national tax law plays an important role for the awareness of the issue in a given 
jurisdiction. However, there may also be exceptions where the administrative procedures are very 
sophisticated and based purely on guidelines. To bring these aspects together, we define the need for 
disclosure as a valid measure for the enforcement of documentation requirements and, in turn, transfer 
pricing regulations because it stands for a requirement of documentation connected with a definite 
annual deadline for submission. It thereby encourages taxpayers to comply with transfer pricing 
regulations. 
Based on this reasoning, we define six categories in order to evaluate the strictness of transfer pricing 
regulations in a given country. The categories are as follows: 
Table 1: Categories of Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Category Description 
Category 0 No general anti-avoidance rule/no transfer pricing regulations or 
documentation requirements exist 
Category 1 Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general 
anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, but no 
documentation requirement 
Category 2 Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general 
anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documentation 
requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but required to exist 
in practice (audit) 
Category 3 Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general 
anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law, but full documentation 
must only be available upon request 
Category 4 Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general 
anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law), a short disclosure of 
documentation is required 
Category 5 Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general 
anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law), a long disclosure of 
documentation is required 
 
The categories defined in Table 1 account for the existence of transfer pricing regulations, the 
introduction of documentation requirements into the national tax law as well as the required 
disclosure. As mentioned in Chapter 4.3, the content of the required documentation is extremely 
difficult to identify, therefore it is not considered.  
Other elements of transfer pricing regulations that could also be used for this measure are the 
definition of related parties, the deadlines for documentation, the statute of limitations, and penalties. 
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Clearly, the lower the applicable threshold, the shorter the deadlines, the longer the statute of 
limitations, and the higher the penalties, the stricter are the regulations. But as the weight of each 
single element is very difficult to assess, we believe that they should not be accounted for by 
additional categories. Much rather, they could be used as separate variables. 
For the countries considered in this study, the distribution over the categories is given in the following 
table. 
Table 2: Category allocation to the considered countries
55
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Brazil 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Canada 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Colombia 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 
Mexico 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Peru n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 5 5 5 5 
United 
States 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Venezuela 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
China 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
India 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Indonesia 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Japan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Malaysia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 
Thailand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Vietnam 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
EUROPE 
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Czech 
Republic 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Denmark 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Finland n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
Hungary 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Luxem-
bourg 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
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Norway n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 4 4 
Poland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Portugal 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Romania n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Russia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Slovak 
Republic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 4 4 
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
The categorization in Table 2 shows that 26 out of the 44 considered countries did not change the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations. They are allocated to the same category over the considered 
time period. But the other 18 countries changed transfer pricing regulations and, in all cases, increased 
their strictness. Most countries increased the strictness with regard to 1 or 2 category steps, by 
introducing documentation or disclosure requirements. But few countries (Ecuador, Indonesia, and the 
Netherlands) show a more significant increase. Ecuador, for instance, has not applied any anti-
avoidance rule until it introduced comprehensive transfer pricing rules in 2005. Therefore it increases 
from Category 0 to Category 5 over the considered time period.  
When comparing the categories for each country in the first year that information is available and in 
the last year (2009), the distribution displayed in Figure 4 is found. 
Figure 4: Development of categories over time 
 
Considering the development over time, Figure 4 also shows that transfer pricing regulations became 
stricter. While in the first year of available information, 28 countries were attributed to categories 0, 1, 
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and 2, in the last year, it was only 12 countries. The greatest decrease over time was recognized by 
category 2, while category 3 denotes the highest increase. This means that many countries introduced 
a statutory documentation requirement. 
The same diagram can be plotted for geographical areas (due to the different size of the areas, numbers 
are expressed in percent). Figure 5 displays the results for North and South America, Asia, and 
Australia, Figure 6 the results for Europe. 
Figure 5: Categories in North and South America, Asia, and Australia 
 
Figure 6: Categories in Europe 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show again that the development in North America, South America, Asia, and 
Australia is different from the development in Europe. In the first group of countries, more than 80% 
of countries require disclosure of documentation, while in Europe it is only 32%. The increase of 
Category 3 can only be accounted to European countries since in American and Asian countries, a 
statutory requirement is in all cases connected with a disclosure. The findings are generally in line 
with the results found in the survey conducted by Ernst & Young where multinationals from the 
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United States, Mexico, India, and Argentina stated that they spend a lot of resources on preparing 
documentation.
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6 Conclusion 
(1) As intercompany profit shifting offers opportunities for international tax planning, many 
countries focus on transfer pricing regulations in order to secure tax revenues. The survey 
conducted in this study underlines the increasing awareness and importance of transfer pricing 
regulations. The majority of countries introduced transfer pricing regulations in the last two 
decades. Only 7 out of the 44 considered countries do not impose transfer pricing regulations 
which may be explained by them being either low-tax or developing jurisdictions. Where present, 
transfer pricing regulations usually apply to foreign related parties only. An exception holds for 
those countries offering tax incentives where also domestic related parties are subject to the rules. 
In South America, also third parties in tax havens are often treated as related parties. 
(2) Regarding transfer pricing methods, there is only little variation between countries. The methods 
outlined by the OECD are mainly accepted. Only differences exist, however, in the priority of 
methods. While the majority of countries prefers the traditional methods over transactional profits 
methods, nine countries apply a best method rule. 
(3) Documentation requirements were introduced to a great extent in the considered time period. 
Southern American and Asian countries introduced them in connection with the transfer pricing 
regulations, and European countries mainly extended the scope of existing rules by 
documentation requirements. A disclosure of documents is mainly required in South America and 
Asia, in Europe only few countries require information included in the tax return.  
(4) Only twelve countries impose special transfer pricing penalties, especially with respect to 
documentation. The design of penalties is similar - usually a certain percentage on the tax 
adjustment, a late interest, and a fixed monetary fine on noncompliance - but the amounts vary 
notably. In case of fraud, penalties are often at least doubled. 
(5) The possibility to enter into advance pricing agreements is increasing with only nine countries not 
allowing for such agreements. 
(6) The categorization of transfer pricing regulations undertaken in this study shows that the 
regulations have become stricter over time. It seems that they are generally less strict in Europe as 
only 32% of countries fall under the highest categories, compared to more than 80% of countries 
outside of Europe. 
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 See Ernst & Young, 2010 Global Transfer Pricing Survey, p. 4. 
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Table A1: Transfer Pricing Existence and Applicability 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
Brazil 
Existence TP regulations since 1997, but not arm’s length principle, instead: maximum price ceilings and minimum gross income floors 
Applicability foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party > 10%; common 
Canada 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Chile 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a n/a foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Colombia 
Existence n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Ecuador 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule which has never been applied in 
practice 
1.1.2005: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
- - - - foreign related entities 30.12.2007: foreign related 
entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party 
- - - - de facto; common 30.12.2007: > 25%; de facto; 
common 
Mexico 
Existence TP regulations since 1996 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Peru 
Existence 1.1.2001: TP regulations are introduced 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 30%; de facto; common 
United Existence TP regulations since 1968 
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 For references see end of Appendix. 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
States Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 
Venezuela 
Existence 
anti-avoidance 
rule regarding 
imports/exports 
28.12.2001: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
foreign related 
entities 
domestic and foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Existence TP regulations since 1981 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 
China 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule since 1991 (for foreign companies), 1993 (for domestic companies) 1.1.2008: introduction of TP 
regulations 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
India 
Existence 1.4.2001: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 26%; de facto; common 
Indonesia 
Existence TP regulations since 1984 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Japan 
Existence TP regulations since 1986 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
Malaysia 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule  1.1.2009: 
additional 
anti-avoidance 
rule is 
introduced 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - 1.7.2003: no threshold; de facto; common 
Philippines 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1939 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Thailand 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a 16.5.2002: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a 16.5.2002: no threshold; de facto; common 
Vietnam 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 28.1.2006: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 1.1.2004: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - > 20%; de facto; common 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule (OECD guidelines have been issued for guidance in 1996) 
Applicability no provision in national tax law; OECD: foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no provision in national tax law; OECD: no threshold; de facto; common 
Belgium 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 19.7.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Czech 
Republic 
Existence TP regulations since 1993 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Denmark 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Finland 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 1.1.2007: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
France 
Existence TP regulations since 1996 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Germany 
Existence TP regulations since 1983 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Greece 
Existence TP regulations since 1994 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Existence TP regulations since 1992 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ireland 
Existence anti-avoidance rules specified for certain transactions (rule on foreign transactions is not applied in practice) 
Applicability n/a domestic related entities subject to tax incentives 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Italy 
Existence TP regulations since 1988 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Luxembourg 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands 
Existence 
general anti-
avoidance rule 
1.1.2002: introduction of TP regulations  
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Norway 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Poland 
Existence TP regulations since 1992 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 1.1.2004: > 5%; de facto; common 
Portugal 
Existence 
general anti-
avoidance rule 
1.1.2002: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a > 10%; de facto; common 
Romania 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1994 1.1.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - 1.1.2004: > 25%; de facto; common 
Russia 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 20%; de facto; common 
Slovak 
Republic 
Existence TP regulations since 1993 
Applicability foreign related parties 
Rel. Party n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
Slovenia 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 1.1.2005: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Spain 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.12.2006: > 25%; de facto; common 
Sweden 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1928 1.1.2007: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - - no threshold; de facto; common 
Switzerland 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rel. Party - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 20%; de facto; common 
United 
Kingdom 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability foreign related entities 1.4.2004: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a > 40%; de facto; common 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year.   
Existence: general anti-avoidance rule: arm’s length principle stated in the national tax code; guidelines may be based on general anti-avoidance rules.  
TP regulations: in addition documentation rules, definition of methods, related entities etc. exist in the law 
Related Party: de facto: de facto control (control of management; exercise of significant influence); common: under common control ;  
Poland: related party definitions apply to cross-border transactions, slightly different for domestic transactions. 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A2: Transfer Pricing Methods 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 22.10.2003: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, shipment value 
Priority best method best method, shipment value if applicable 
Brazil 
Methods CUP, RPM (fixed margins), Cost Plus (fixed margins) 
Priority method that yields lowest taxable income 
Canada Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Chile 
Methods CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Colombia 
Methods n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: most appropriate method 
Ecuador 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority 
n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - 15.5.2008: 
CUP, RPM, 
Cost Plus, 
Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Mexico 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority 
- - - - - - 1.1.2007: transaction-based over profit-based, 
priority for CUP 
Peru 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, other 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a most appropriate method 
United 
States 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, CPM 
Priority best method 
Venezuela 
Methods n/a 28.12.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority  n/a most appropriate method, priority for CUP 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
China 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority most appropriate method 
India 
Methods 1.4.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority 1.4.2001: most appropriate method 
Indonesia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Japan 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Malaysia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Philippines 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a most appropriate method 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Thailand 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Vietnam 
Methods 8.3.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 1.1.2006: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a most appropriate method 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Belgium 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Czech 
Republic 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Denmark 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Finland 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 1.1.2007: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Priority - - - - - - transaction-based over profit-based 
France 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Germany 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 12.4.2005: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Greece 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP CUP 1.1.2009: 
CUP, RPM, 
Cost Plus, 
Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - - 1.1.2009: 
transaction-
based over 
profit-based, 
priority for 
CUP 
Hungary 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, other 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Ireland 
Methods none specified in domestic law 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Italy 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
Luxem-
bourg 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
Nether-
lands 
Methods n/a 
 
CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Norway 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
Poland 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Portugal 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Romania 
Methods n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
Russia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Priority CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Slovak 
Republic 
Methods 1.1.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Slovenia 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: transaction-based over profit-based 
Spain 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 1.12.2006: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 1.12.2006: transaction-based over profit-based 
Sweden 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Switzer-
land 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Ukraine 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP preferred 
United 
Kingdom 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries;  information as of 1 July of the respective year 
CUP: Comparable Uncontrolled Price, RPM: Resale Price Method, TNMM: Transfer Net Margin Method 
Source: own collection. 
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Table A3: Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content 
1.1.2001: 
long 
long long long long long long long long 
Brazil 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Canada 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Chile 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Colombia 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory requirement, but required in 
practice 
1.1.2004: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no 1.1.2004: yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - - - short short short short short short 
Ecuador 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no 1.1.2005: yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - - - - long long long long long 
Mexico 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1997 
Disclosure 1.1.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Peru 
Stat. Requ. 1.1.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a yes yes yes yes yes 
Content n/a n/a n/a n/a short 1.1.2006: long long long long 
United 
States 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1994 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Venezuela 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory 
requirement 
1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
China 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short 1.1.2008: long long 
India 
Stat. Requ. 1.4.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Indonesia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short 1.1.2009: long 
Japan 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Malaysia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.7.2003: no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Philippines 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Vietnam 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 28.1.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no 28.1.2006: yes yes yes yes 
Content - - - - - short short short short 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
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Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content  short short short short short short short short short 
Finland 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no 1.1.2009: yes 
Content - - - - - - - - short 
France 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content  - - - - - - - - - 
Germany 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory requirement, but 
required in practice 
1.1.2003: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Greece 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory requirement, but 
required in practice 
1.1.2003: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Ireland 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content  short short short short short short short short short 
Luxem-
bourg 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Nether-
lands 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory 
requirement 
1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
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Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
Norway 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no 1.1.2008: yes yes 
Content - - - - - - - short short 
Poland 
Stat. Requ. 1.1.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure 7.5.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Portugal 
Stat. Requ. n/a 1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
Romania 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.7.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Russia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Slovak 
Republic 
Stat. Requ. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2009: 
statutory 
requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Slovenia 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.9.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes yes yes 
Content n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a short short short 
Spain 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.12.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer-
land 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
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Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
statutory requirement: documentation requirement is included in the national tax law (not administrative guidelines) 
short: a summary or an overview over transactions has to be submitted 
long: full documentation has to be submitted; in some cases, only a short content is applicable to small enterprises or low incomes (Ecuador, Mexico, Peru) 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A4: Deadlines of Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Country  National Regulations on Submission Deadlines 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return 5 months after fiscal year end 8 months after fiscal year end 
Brazil 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return 
30 
September 
30 June 
Canada 
Full Doc. within 3 months of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 
Chile 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Colombia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return - - - 2 September 30 June 11 July 22 July 
Ecuador 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - - 
Tax Return 
- - - - within 12 months of tax return within 6 
months of tax 
return 
Mexico Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Tax Return n/a 31 July 31 May n/a n/a 30 June 
Peru 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - 
Tax Return n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 25 July 31 July 
United 
States 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 15
th
 of third month after fiscal year end 
Venezuela 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tax Return - 30 June 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 2 weeks of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end  5 months after fiscal year end 15
th
 of seventh month after fiscal year end 
China 
Full Doc. n/a within 60 days of request - - 
Tax Return 4 months after fiscal year end 5 months after fiscal year end 
India 
Full Doc. n/a - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return n/a 31 October 30 September 
Indonesia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - 
Tax Return - 3 months after fiscal year end 4 months after fiscal year end 
Japan 
Full Doc. case by case 
Tax Return 2 months after fiscal year end 
Malaysia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 7 months after fiscal year end 
Philippines 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 45 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Vietnam 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 
- - - - - 2 months after 
fiscal year end 
90 days after fiscal year end 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 3 weeks of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Denmark 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 
Finland 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return 
- - - - - - - - 4 months after 
fiscal year end 
France 
Full Doc. within 60 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Germany 
Full Doc. n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Greece 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - n/a n/a 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 3 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Ireland 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
Full Doc. n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return n/a n/a 10 months after fiscal year end 7 months after fiscal year end 
Luxem-
bourg 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Nether-
lands 
Full Doc. n/a within 3 months of request 
Tax Return 
- 6 months after fiscal year end 5 months after 
fiscal year end 
Norway 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a within 4 weeks of request within 45 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - 31 May 31 May 
Poland 
Full Doc. within 7 days of request 
Tax Return 
- 9 months after 
fiscal year end 
3 months after fiscal year end 
Portugal 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 10 days of request 
Tax Return - 31 May 
Romania 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Russia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 10 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Slovak 
Republic 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Slovenia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 90 days of request 
Tax Return n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 months after fiscal year end 
Spain 
Full Doc. case by case 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer-
land 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A5: Transfer Pricing Penalties 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Penalties  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argen- 
tina 
TP Penalty 
no no no 14.11.2003: 
yes 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 
50-100% of unpaid tax; up to 10 times unpaid 
tax in case of fraud; late interest (3% per 
month) 
14.11.2003: 100-400% of unpaid tax; up to 10 times unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (3% 
per month) 
Documentation n/a fixed fine for not filing return 14.11.2003: up to ARS 450,000 (~USD 150,000) for noncompliance 
Brazil 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest 75-150% of unpaid tax; late interest (federal interest rate) 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Documentation 
n/a 112.5-225% of unpaid tax if no documentation 112.5-225% of unpaid tax if no 
documentation ; 5% of 
transaction price for incorrect or 
omitted information; 0.02% of 
net revenue per day for failure 
to submit online 
Canada 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 10% of TP adjustment if certain threshold is exceeded (CAD 5mio. or 10% of gross revenue); late interest 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Chile 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment up to 30% of unpaid tax; up to 300% in case of fraud; late interest (1.5% per month) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Colom- 
bia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a up to 160% of unpaid tax 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: 1% of total value of transaction or 0,5% of net worth for wrong or late 
documentation (max. 30,000 TU) and for no filing of documentation (max. 40,000 
TU) 
Ecuador 
TP Penalty 
no no no no no no no 30.12.2007: 
yes 
yes 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Documentation 
- - - - - - - 30.12.2007: up to USD 15,000 
for incorrect or late filing of tax 
return 
Mexico 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
50-100% of unpaid tax; late interest  50-75% of unpaid tax; late 
interest 
Documentation ~MXN 47,640-95,820 (~USD 4,100-8,300) for failure to file tax return 
Peru 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a up to 50% of unpaid tax 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a up to 30 TU (~USD 30,000) for noncompliance up to 0.6% of net income for 
noncompliance (max up to 25 
TU (~USD 27,500)) 
United 
States 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 20-40% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Vene- TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
zuela Adjustment n/a 25-200% of unpaid tax; late interest; imprisonment 
Documentation n/a 28.12.2001: 300-500 TU for failure to submit documentation; 10-50 TU for failure to file return (1 TU=~USD 16) 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 10-25% of unpaid tax; 50% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
China 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no 1.1.2008: yes yes 
Adjustment 
late interest 
(0.2% per 
day) 
1.5.2002: late interest (0.05% per day); up to 500% of unpaid tax in case of fraud 1.1.2008: additional special 
interest levy: federal interest 
rate + 5% on tax adjustment; 
late interest (0.05% per day); up 
to 500% of unpaid tax in case of 
fraud 
Documentation up to CNY 10,000 for late filing of tax return; up to CNY 50,000 for serious offense 
India 
TP Penalty 1.4.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 1.4.2001: 100-300% of unpaid tax 
Documentation 
1.4.2001: 2% of aggregate value of international transactions for incorrect documentation; INR 100,000 (~USD 2,200) for failure to submit 
accountant’s report 
Indo- 
nesia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (2% per month, up to 48% of unpaid tax); 200-400% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; imprisonment 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Japan 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 10-15% of unpaid tax; 35% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (max. 7.3% per year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Malaysia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
70-100% of unpaid tax; up to 300% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; imprisonment 1.1.2009: up to 
45% of unpaid 
tax 
Documentation 
15-70% of unpaid tax for incorrect return 1.1.2007: 15-45% of unpaid tax for incorrect 
return 
Philip- 
pines 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 25% surcharge on unpaid tax; 50% surcharge in case of fraud; late interest (20% 
per year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Adjustment up to 200% of unpaid tax; late interest (1.5% per month (max. 100% of unpaid tax)) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Vietnam 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
up to 500% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (0.1% per day) n/a 10% of unpaid tax; 100-300% 
of unpaid tax in case of fraud; 
late interest (0.05% per day) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
EUROPE 
Austria 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 2% of unpaid tax; late interest (2% above federal interest rate) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (7% per year) 
Documentation 10-200% of unpaid tax for failure to file (correct) tax return 
Czech 
Republic 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
0,05-0,2% of unpaid tax per day for first 500 days; afterwards late interest (140% of federal 
interest rate) 
1.1.2007: 20% of unpaid tax; late interest 
(federal interest rate +14%) 
Documentation 
up to CZK 2 mio. for non-financial obligations 
that are not fulfilled 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark 
TP Penalty no no no no no 2.4.2006: yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 
up to 200% of unpaid tax; 10% surcharge on 
unpaid tax; late interest (0.6% per month); 
imprisonment 
surcharge on unpaid tax (5.7% in 2004, 5.4% in 2005, 5.3% in 2006, 5.8% in 2007, 6.3% in 2008, 
6.1% in 2009); late interest (0.6% per month in 2004, 0.5% in 2005-2006, 0.6% in 2007-2009); 
imprisonment 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.4.2006: 200% of costs saved; minimum fine is increased by 
10% of TP adjustment if applicable 
Finland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 5-30% of TP adjustment; late interest (market rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to EUR 25,000 for noncompliance 
France 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 40% of unpaid tax; 80% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (0.75% per month, 0.4% per month starting 2007) 
Documentation EUR 7,500 per year for insufficient documentation 1.1.2006: EUR 10,000 per year for insufficient documentation 
Germany 
TP Penalty no no no 1.1.2004: yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment late interest (0.5% per month) 
Documentation 
- - - 1.1.2004: 5-10% of TP adjustment if failure to submit documentation, min. EUR 5,000; late 
submission: EUR 100 per day, max. EUR 1 mio. 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Greece 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 10% of TP adjustment 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2% of unpaid tax per day for 
inaccurate return (max. 200% 
of unpaid tax) 
18.12.2008: 
10% of the 
value of the 
transaction for 
not filing 
documentation; 
2% per day for 
inaccurate 
return (max. 
200% of 
unpaid tax) 
Hungary 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 50% of unpaid tax; late interest (200% of federal interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: up to HUF 2 mio. (~USD 10,000) per transaction for noncompliance 
Ireland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest 1.8.2002: 20-100% of unpaid tax; late interest (11.75% per year, 9.96% per year in 2009) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 100-240% of unpaid tax; late interest; 15.4.2000:  imprisonment 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Luxem-
bourg 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a late interest (0.6% per month) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Nether-
lands 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment  25-100% of unpaid tax; late interest 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Norway 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a up to 60% of unpaid tax; late interest (7% per year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Poland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment TP adjustment is taxed at 50%; late interest (200% of federal interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Portugal TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Adjustment 
20-100% of unpaid tax, up to 200% in case of fraud (max. EUR 30,000, fraud: EUR 110,000); late interest (7% per year in 2002-2004, 4% per year 
since 2005) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a up to EUR 100,000 for noncompliance 
Romania 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no 8.2.2008: yes yes 
Adjustment 
1.9.2000: late 
interest 
(0.15% per 
day) 
1.10.2001: 0.5% of unpaid tax per month;  
30.10.2001: late interest (0.06% per day) 
1.1.2006: 0.1% per day on unpaid tax 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.2.2008: up to RON 14,000 
(~EUR 3,900) for no 
documentation 
Russia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 20% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (1/300 of federal interest rate per day) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Slovak 
Republic 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: late interest (300% of federal interest rate) 31.12.2008: 
late interest 
(300% of ECB 
interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to SIT 6mio. (~EUR 24,000) for wrong or 
late documentation 
Spain 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no 19.2.2009: yes 
Adjustment 
50-150% of unpaid tax; late interest 19.2.2009: 
15% of TP 
adjustment 
Documentation 
- - - - - - - - 19.2.2009: 
EUR 1,500 per 
missing 
information  
Sweden 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment  10-40% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer- TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
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land Adjustment late interest 100-300% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 100% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (market rate) 1.1.2004-31.3.2006: no penalties are imposed late interest (market rate) 
Documentation 
up to 100% of unpaid tax for incorrect tax 
return 
up to 100% of unpaid tax for incorrect tax return 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
TU: tax unit 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A6: Statute of Limitations 
Country National Regulations on Statute of Limitations 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina n/a 5 years from filing year end 
Brazil n/a 5 years from filing date 
Canada n/a 7 years from filing date 
Chile n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from filing date 
Colombia 2 years from filing date; 5 years if not filed 
Ecuador n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from filing date; 6 years if not filed 
Mexico 5 years from filing date 
Peru n/a n/a 4 years from filing year end; 6 years if not filed 
United States n/a up to 6 years from filing date; unlimited in case of fraud 
Venezuela n/a n/a 4 years from filing date; 6 years if noncompliance 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia n/a unlimited 
China n/a up to 10 years from tax year end 
India n/a 3 years from tax year end n/a 45 months from tax year end 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Indonesia 
10 years from tax year end 1.1.2008: 5 years from tax year 
end; unlimited in case of fraud 
Japan n/a 6 years from filing date 
Malaysia n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end; unlimited in case of fraud 
Philippines n/a n/a 3 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Thailand n/a up to 5 years from filing date; 10 years if not filed 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 5 years from tax year end 
EUROPE 
Austria up to 15 years from tax year end 1.1.2005: up to 10 years from tax year end  
Belgium 
n/a 3 years from tax year end; 5 years in case of fraud 1.1.2009: 3 
years from tax 
year end; 7 
years in case 
of fraud 
Czech  
Republic 
up to 17 years from filing year end 1.1.2004: up to 15 years from filing year end 
Denmark n/a 5 years and 4 months from tax year end 
Finland n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end 
France 3 years from tax year end; 10 years in case of fraud 
Germany 4 years from filing year end; 10 years in case of fraud 
Greece 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 years from filing year end; 10 years in case of 
fraud 
Hungary 5 years from filing year end 
Ireland n/a 6 years from tax year end 1.1.2005: 4 years from filing year end 
Italy 4 years from filing year end; 8 years in case of fraud 
Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a n/a 5 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Netherlands n/a 5 years from tax year end; 12 years if foreign income 
Norway n/a 10 years from tax year end 
Poland n/a n/a 5 years from filing year end 
Portugal n/a 4 years from tax year end 
Romania n/a 5 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Russia n/a 3 years from tax year end 
Slovak 
Republic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 10 years from filing year end 
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 10 years from tax year end 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Spain n/a 4 years from filing date 
Sweden n/a 6 years from tax year end 
Switzerland up to 15 years from filing year end 
Ukraine n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from tax year end; unlimited in case of fraud 
United 
Kingdom 
n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end; 21 years in case of fraud 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
Source: own collection 
 
Table A7: Advance Pricing Arrangements 
Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Brazil unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Canada 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Chile not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Colombia 
n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral 5.1.2006: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Ecuador 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 30.12.2007:  
unilateral 
unilateral 
Mexico 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Peru not available not available not available not available not available not available unilateral unilateral unilateral 
United States 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Venezuela 
not available 28.12.2001: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
China 
unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 3.9.2004: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
India not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Indonesia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Japan 
1.6.2001: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Malaysia 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2009: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Philippines not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Thailand 
n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
EUROPE 
Austria unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Belgium unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Czech 
Republic 
not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2006: 
unilateral 
unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Denmark 
n/a unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Finland unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
France 
bilateral bilateral bilateral 1.1.2004: 
unilateral 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Germany 
not available not available not available not available not available 5.6.2006: 
bilateral 
bilateral bilateral bilateral 
Greece not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Hungary 
not available not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2007: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
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Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ireland unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Italy unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Luxembourg unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Netherlands 
1.4.2001: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Norway not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Poland 
not available not available not available not available 1.1.2005: 
unilateral 
1.1.2006: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Portugal 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 17.7.2008: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Romania 
not available not available not available not available not available not available 12.6.2007: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Russia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Slovak 
Republic 
unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Slovenia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Spain 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Sweden not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ukraine n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral 
United 
Kingdom 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
not available: no kind of advance pricing agreement is available, an exception might exist under a double tax treaty 
unilateral: an advance ruling by the domestic tax authorities is available 
bilateral: an advance pricing agreement between two jurisdictions is available (can be extended to a multilateral agreement) 
Source: own collection. 
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